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Workplace Mediation:
The First-Phase, Private Caucus
in Individual Discrimination Disputes
Emily M. Calhount
Mediation processes are sufficiently well-established 1 that we
have moved away from categorical opinions about the wisdom of us-
ing mediation in civil rights disputes to more strategic discussions.
We no longer dwell on an all-or-nothing choice reflected in the long-
running debate about whether civil rights conflicts should be medi-
ated or whether, as Justice Marshall once pronounced, they "belong
in court."2 Instead the relevant question is "When is it appropriate to
t Emily M. Calhoun, Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I am indebted
to my colleague, Professor Scott Peppet, for his astute suggestions, and to my research
assistant, Marci Meier, for her exceptionally thorough and insightful recent work. I
also especially thank Mary Margaret Golten, founding partner of CDR Associates, for
the many useful discussions we have had about the propriety of mediating civil rights
disputes and for her willingness to read and comment on this Article.
1. Much literature attests to the various forms of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion being used in discrimination disputes and to the pressures for such use. See, e.g.,
the discussions of the growth of ADR and mediation in JONATHAN G. SHAILOR, EMPOw-
ERMENT IN DISPUTE MEDIATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION 2-5 (1994);
Allison Balc, Making it Work at Work: Mediation's Impact on Employee/Employer
Relationships and Mediator Neutrality, 2 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 241 (2002); Thomas
A. Kochan et al., The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Alternative
Dispute Resolution Program, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 233 (2000); Jonathan R.
Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving Sex-
ual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 151-56 (1999); and Aimee
Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist, Mediation in Employment Cases is Too Little Too Late:
An Organizational Conflict Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 261, 262-64 (1998). There are, of course, areas in which mediation is
used rarely, perhaps because of a lack of information about and understanding of the
process. See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Carol Archbold, Mediating Citizen Complaints
Against the Police: An Exploratory Study, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 231.
2. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984), cited with approval in Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 148 (1988). To review arguments made in the debate over the
propriety of using ADR in civil rights disputes, see, for example, JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? (1983); Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Jus-
tice, 1 POL. OF INFORMAL JUST. 267 (1982); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule Making, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its Own: Conflicts
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets]; Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing
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mediate a given civil rights dispute and under what specific procedu-
ral understandings?"3 We attempt to figure out how to "fit the forum
to the fuss." 4 This Article proposes that a first-phase, private caucus
is an essential procedural element when individual, workplace dis-
crimination disputes are presented for mediation, and that the cau-
cus should be used for the quite specific purpose of cultivating the
gender or racial group presence inherent in a discrimination
dispute. 5
Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 211 (1995); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierar-
chy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies,
79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adver-
sary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted, or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (1991); Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Nega-
tive Cultural Myths, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 55 (1995); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and
Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 482 (1987); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1986); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (1985); Janet Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective:
Promise and Problems, 2 LAw & INEQ. J. 21 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94
YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); and Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984).
3. For an excellent strategically-oriented discussion, see Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 556 (2001). See also Matthew A. Swendiman, The EEOC Mediation Program:
Panacea or Panicked Reaction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 391 (2001); Kochan et
al., supra note 1; Robert Ricigliano et al., Problems Without a Process: Using an Ac-
tion Dialogue to Manage Racial Tensions, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 83 (1999); Michael
J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583; and
Wallace Warfield, Building Consensus for Racial Harmony in American Cities: Case
Model Approach, 1996 J. Disp. RESOL. 151. Even long-time opponents of alternative
forms of dispute resolution have begun discussing when and under what conditions
mediation is appropriate. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A Collo-
quy on Race, Community, and Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000). The task of devel-
oping a good strategy is complicated by confidentiality, which tends to limit
researcher access to participants in mediation. Kochan et al., supra note 1. This is a
problem for anyone who hopes to analyze mediation "from the perspective of those
inside the process." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dismantling the Master's House: Essays
in Memory of Trina Grillo: What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation, Ine-
quality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1423 (1997) [hereinafter Disman-
tling the Master's House].
4. Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets, supra note 2, at 1901 (ex-
panding on a phrase first used by Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg).
5. This Article focuses on race and gender discrimination in the workplace, al-
though its thesis is relevant to other groups affected by discrimination and to other
settings. The use of generalized references to racial and gender groups to present the
thesis should not obscure the complexity of cross-group or multi-racial identities.
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The first-phase, private caucus recommended in this Article is a
private meeting between mediator and complainant in a discrimina-
tion dispute. It is part of the mediation but occurs before negotiation
takes place between the parties to a workplace discrimination dis-
pute. In mere procedural terms, one might think of the first-phase,
private caucus as an adaptation and expansion of the brief, early pri-
vate meetings commonly used by mediators to familiarize each dispu-
tant with the mediation process, and to gather preliminary facts.
The first-phase, private caucus, however, serves the qualitatively dis-
tinct objective of self-determination in the mediation process and its
outcomes.
This Article focuses on workplace discrimination disputes that
emerge as individual complaints of discriminatory treatment, but it
takes into account the fact that all racial or gender discrimination is
inherently group-based. By definition, an employer accused of inten-
tional discrimination is alleged to have imposed his conception of race
or gender and the stereotyped roles deemed proper for members of
racial or gender groups in making decisions about an individual. Dis-
parate impact discrimination, by definition, occurs when the adverse
impacts of facially neutral employer practices are disproportionately
borne by discrete racial or gender groups; the employer tolerates ad-
verse group impacts reflecting racial or gender stigma. 6 In either
event, the individual will naturally identify herself and her predica-
ment with the relevant racial or gender group. 7
The group that defines (in the employer's mind) the individual -
and (in the employee's mind) the discriminatory event - is a figura-
tive or "virtual" presence with which to be contended in mediation,
even though that group never becomes a formal party to the individ-
ual dispute. Clarifying the meaning of the group presence for each
individual disputant is a necessary part of understanding the stakes
6. For an excellent discussion of the nature of racial discrimination, which ex-
plains these concepts in more depth, see GLENN C. LouRy, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY (2002) 9, 18, 59-60, 111, 161-62, 167-68 (discussing the way in which ra-
cial identity is imputed to others through racial stereotyping and stigma). Loury also
emphasizes the central role that "race indifference" - i.e., acts taken "with no concern
as to what impact that [act] might have upon" a racial group - plays in producing
inequities. Id. at 133-54. Cf Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and
Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 283-84 (1995)
(discussing social identity, i.e., an identity ascribed to persons based on "categories of
identity informed by the roles and scripts provided by myth").
7. See LOURY, supra note 6, at 98, 143-45 (discussing how persons turn to "inter-
nal institution building, mutual affirmation, and selective association" with the racial
group to which they have been assigned by others).
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in and remedial options for a mediated solution to the problem of dis-
crimination. It also serves to protect party self-determination, the
"most fundamental principle" of mediation.8 By cultivating the group
presence, a mediator will ensure that an individual disputant has the
knowledge and capacity to make truly autonomous choices about me-
diation processes and outcomes in a discrimination dispute. Ignoring
the group presence, however, puts both the problem-solving potential
and self-determination principle of mediation at risk. Just as an ide-
ological commitment to "color-blindness" will undermine the legiti-
macy and effectiveness of judicial responses to the problem of racial
discrimination, 9 so effacement of the group presence will fundamen-
tally compromise mediation. The first-phase, private caucus is where
connections between the individual and his or her racial or gender
group can be constructively explored.
Section I begins with Susan Sturm's suggestion that a "deep un-
derstanding" of the nature of civil rights disputes is required if one is
to make useful and specific suggestions about how dispute resolution
processes should look. 10 It contains a brief reminder of the central
role of awareness in civil rights disputes and of the way in which
traditional legal processes have sustained oppression by denying new
awarenesses. Section I can be read as a cautionary tale, drawn from
judicial processes and illustrating the way in which justice goes awry
when otherwise perfectly valid processes neglect awareness.
8. For an explanation of the self-determination principles on which mediation is
based, see James J. Alfini, Mediator Ethics in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE 65 (Phyllis Bernard et al. eds., 2002), and Donald T. Weckstein, In
Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501
(1997). The American Bar Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution (now the Association for Conflict Resolution) adopted a self-determination,
consent model of mediation. See Alfini at 65-66. Mediation traditions link self-deter-
mination to empowerment. See, e.g., Ilan G. Gewurz, (Re)Designing Mediation to Ad-
dress the Nuances of Power Imbalance, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 135 (2001); Kate
McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist Jurispruden-
tial Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 459 (2001); SHAILOR, supra note 1, at 6; Menkel-
Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets, supra note 2, at 1900; Harkavy, supra note
1; Gunning, supra note 2; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Media-
tion: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 775 (1999); Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 909 (1998); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 253 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 6, at 334 (if harm is racial, remedies must take
race into account); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individ-
ual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455 (2002) (discussing the
contemporary debate over colorblindness doctrine and concluding that race has a tan-
gible and real quality that must be accounted for in disputes).
10. Sturm, supra note 3, at 556.
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Section II discusses why gender and racial groups are a signifi-
cant - albeit only intangible - corollary to awareness and an inevita-
ble presence in individual discrimination disputes. It begins to
develop the reasons why the group presence should be important to
mediators committed to self-determination.
Section III recommends conscious and focused use of first-phase,
private caucuses to cultivate (i.e., to enhance awareness of) the group
presence in the workplace in individual discrimination disputes. Me-
diation processes described in the professional literature typically
conform to generally agreed-upon standards, but mediators under-
stand that the conventional format may require adaptation to meet
the needs of given parties.1 1 Mediators anticipate creativity in pro-
cess design; indeed, flexibility and adaptability give mediation its ap-
peal.12 Adapting the private caucus to cultivate the group presence
in an individual discrimination dispute will enhance the quality of
problem-solving that occurs in mediation and will also fulfill media-
tor ethical obligations to preserve self-determination within media-
tion. The proposal for first-phase, private caucuses embodies the
following paradox: by taking advantage of a very early opportunity to
enhance the individual awareness and group presence that drives a
discrimination dispute, just resolutions of the conflict will more likely
be secured through mediation.
11. For a discussion of typical mediation formats, see, for example, JAMES J. AL-
FINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001); KIMBERLEE KOVACH, MEDIATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (1994); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (1986). As emphasized by Menkel-
Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets, supra note 2, at 1872, 1900, and Edwin H.
Greenebaum, On Teaching Mediation, 1999 J. DIsP. RESOL. 115, 116-32 (1999), medi-
ation formats are flexible, and parties can choose - and embody in contracts - desired
procedural elements. Parties generally must agree to the mediation process, which
opens the door to the possibility of private, contractual modifications to suit party
interests. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SCANLON, MEDIATOR'S DESKBOOK 35-36 (1999) (sug-
gesting a form for agreeing to the participation of third parties like experts in a medi-
ation); BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY
PROBLEMS (1989) (describing various ways of approaching multiparty negotiation). Of
course, whatever agreements as to process are struck, they must conform to legal
requirements and proscriptions. Cf Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race and
Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (2002)
(discussing the limitations that federal labor laws may place on race and gender iden-
tity caucuses in the workplace).
12. See, e.g., Harkavy, supra note 1, at 158-59; Greenebaum, supra note 11, at
132; Robert E. Talbot, Symposium: Work in the 21st Century - A Look at the Contem-
porary Labor Movement: A Practical Guide to Representing Parties in EEOC Media-
tions, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 665, 668 (2003) (describing in detail the flexible ways in
which an EEOC mediation may unfold).
Spring 2004]
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
The possibility of using first-phase caucuses for these purposes
should interest both civil rights advocates and mediators. Civil
rights advocates are undoubtedly familiar with the role played by
awareness and the group presence in workplace discrimination con-
flicts but perhaps do not realize that mediation offers a procedural
opportunity for cultivating the group presence. On the other hand,
although experienced mediators of discrimination disputes undoubt-
edly use caucuses for a variety of purposes, the specific purpose rec-
ommended in this Article is not discussed in the readily-accessible
literature on discrimination disputes. The lack of discussion may re-
flect a less-than-optimal understanding of the significance of the
group presence for problem-solving and self-determination in individ-
ual discrimination disputes. If so, the first-phase caucus will be
under-utilized even by experienced mediators. The lack of discussion
also makes it very likely that less-experienced mediators involved in
seemingly run-of-the-mill individual disputes are unaware of an im-
portant obligation and procedure.
Responses to the first-phase caucus proposal are invited from
both mediators and civil rights advocates. What dynamics of the
group presence have been misunderstood or omitted from discussion?
What modifications should be made to the proposal? What procedu-
ral alternatives might serve problem-solving and self-determination
objectives more effectively than the first-phase caucus? What specific
techniques would mediators recommend to implement the proposal?
This Article is intended to provoke a dialogue about how an impor-
tant practical problem might be approached when individual work-
place discrimination disputes are mediated, not to adamantly insist
on an unforgiving procedural mandate.
I. AWARENESS: THE HEART OF DISCRIMINATION CONFLICTS
1 3
Frederick Douglass once cautioned that slavery ". . . has been
called by a great many names, and it will call itself by yet another
13. Awareness is a complex phenomenon. Notwithstanding the fact that the
"little word [is] laden with philosophical dynamite," KENNETH E. BOULDING, CONFLICT
AND DEFENSE: A GENERAL THEORY 183 (1963), it must be discussed because a number
of properties of awareness are relevant to the mediation of civil rights disputes. Cf.
JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND (1992) (asking the reader to think about
the relationship of liquidity to water as a way of understanding the properties of
consciousness). Awareness, for example, resists transference. Feminist attempts to
convince others that law has a deficient way of seeing the world illustrate the
difficulty of transferring awareness. Neither those who have tried conventional
intellectual argument, nor those who have turned to storytelling, nor those who have
taken a process-oriented approach, have been entirely successful in proposing ways of
[Vol. 9:187
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name; and you and I and all of us had better wait and see what new
form this old monster will assume, in what new skin this old snake
will come forth."1 4 Similarly, problems of gender and race discrimi-
nation recur in different forms and circumstances. As women and
minorities learn to see these new forms and circumstances clearly -
as a new manifestation of discrimination - a civil rights conflict
arises.
Law plays a secondary, supporting role in this view of discrimi-
nation conflicts. Conflicts do not arise because some person identifies
an occasion on which rights clearly granted by the Constitution or
laws of the United States have unquestionably been denied. Rather,
discrimination disputes tend to exist precisely because a person or
group persists in addressing a problem as a discrimination problem
despite the refusal of prevailing legal institutions to see and address
the problem. Unless individuals are willing and able to fit their
claims within prevailing legal norms, courts may deem a dispute non-
existent despite the fact that, in the real world, the conflict continues
to unfold. 15
It is no secret that law is frequently at odds with the awareness
of women and minorities. 16 One might illustrate the point with any
transferring awareness. The property of weak transference is relevant to whether
certain goals of mediation are realistic, but that is a subject for another article.
14. Frederick Douglass, Speech to the American Anti-Slavery Society (May 10,
1865), reprinted in THE AMERICAN READER: WORDS THAT MOVED A NATION 154, 156
(Diane Ravitch ed., 1990).
15. For a recent, extended historical discussion of the discrepancies between
group awareness and law see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV.
2047-62 (2002). See also KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMs 53, 62, 99 (1988) (arguing conformance to the law's norms
may be positively harmful to persons who have suffered discrimination); Barbara
Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture, 98
YALE L.J. 1689 (1989) (claiming the law enforced through constitutional courts fre-
quently considers claims advanced by low-power groups to be trivial to the point of
non-existence); Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the Borderline, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
137 (1993) (arguing standing rules are barriers to new awarenesses). Laws will occa-
sionally directly accord members of minority groups an opportunity to formulate is-
sues through their own perspective. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (2000); Kathryn
Abrams, Raising Politics Up: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988) (discussing statutes that combat con-
straints on participation in the political process).
16. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 107 (1990) (noting one can date
the argument that formal principles of justice frequently omit the perspective of ex-
cluded groups to Montaigne).
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number of examples. Consider contemporary workplace discrimina-
tion.17 It is frequently neither overt nor implemented through rules
or practices that obviously exclude or disadvantage women or minori-
ties. It may stem from cumulative acts of unconscious prejudice or
careless conduct. Under prevailing constitutional doctrine, the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination and
thus may not protect against these forms of discrimination.18 Even
federal statutes prohibiting disparate impact discrimination may not
provide redress against such discrimination, given narrow judicial in-
terpretations of the statutes and employers' increasing sophistication
in anticipating and minimizing the ability of employees to prove dis-
crimination. 19 Individuals resist contemporary workplace discrimi-
nation because they are aware that a racial or gender group is
disadvantaged, not because they have been denied rights clearly
granted by law.
20
For another illustration, think about the Supreme Court's re-
sponse to a desire for increased and more equal allocation of state
resources to historically Black universities in Mississippi in United
States v. Fordice.2 1 The desire apparently reflected an awareness on
the part of at least some African Americans that the problem of seg-
regation in higher education was, for the foreseeable future, intracta-
ble and incapable of being eradicated under prevailing equal
17. See, e.g., NIJOLE V. BENOKRAITIS & JOE R. FEAGIN, MODERN SEXISM: BLATANT,
SUBTLE, AND COVERT DISCRIMINATION, chs. 5-6 (1986); B. RESKIN & H. HARTMANN,
WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 37-87 (1986); Sturm,
supra note 3; Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 1745 (1989).
18. For discussions illustrating the potentially limiting effects of the intent re-
quirement, see Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998);
and Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997).
19. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form From Substance: Understanding Em-
ployer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (1999).
20. Only after years of advocacy, for example, did courts fully accept the idea that
workplace sexual harassment is class-based sex discrimination and not an act of inap-
propriate personal social behavior. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court occasionally still incorporates into the sex-
ual harassment debate concepts that are at odds with women's awareness. The Court
suggests, for example, that workplace sexual harassment is inappropriate because it
constitutes "fighting words," R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992), an
astonishing proposition for women who see harassing speech not as an irresistible
provocation to a physical fight, but as an integral part of a pervasive threat of retalia-
tion against any woman who acts against accepted norms of behavior. For an excel-
lent discussion of the concept of awareness and sexual harassment, see Anna-Marie
Marshall, Injustice Frames, Legality, and the Everyday Construction of Sexual Har-
assment, 28 L. & Soc. Inq. 659 (2003).
21. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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protection principles, and that African Americans might be better
served by a substantial allocation of more state resources to histori-
cally Black (and largely segregated) institutions than by increased
integration efforts of historically white (and largely segregated) insti-
tutions. 22 The Supreme Court deemed the desire incompatible with
the law's rejection of separate but equal arguments in Brown v.
Board of Education.23 Yet the desire and thus the conflict - premised
on an awareness of Brown's insufficient answer to the problem of ra-
cial segregation in higher education - persisted. Eventually the Afri-
can American community prevailed, not by virtue of a
reinterpretation of constitutional mandate, but through a negotiated
consent agre ment promising substantial additional resources for
historically Black institutions.
24
Finally, consider the Supreme Court's description of demonstra-
tions outside abortion clinics - a description that so completely ref-
uses to acknowledge the awareness of women that it fails even to
designate women as primary parties to or objects of those demonstra-
tions. According to the Court in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic,25 anti-abortion demonstrations arise when anti-abortion ac-
tivists attempt to intervene between the "innocent victim" and the
abortionist. 26 Women do not figure in the Court's picture of demon-
strations, although legal definitions of intent would lead to the con-
clusion that the demonstrations are intended to prevent women from
22. One advocate for historically Black institutions is reported to have stated
that the key to remedying racial discrimination in higher education is equity rather
than integration. Molly L. Mitchell, Comment, A Settlement of Ayers v. Musgrove: Is
Mississippi Moving Towards Desegregation in Higher Education or Merely a Separate
but 'More Equal' System?, 71 Miss. L.J. 1011, 1012 (2002). Whether equity was the
primary goal of the original plaintiffs remains to be seen, but at least by the time the
Supreme Court heard arguments in the case, a number of groups representing the
African American community were clearly advocating for an equal resources solution
to the problem of racial discrimination and segregation. See, e.g., Motion of Jackson
State University for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Peti-
tioners and Brief, U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (Nos. 90-1205 and 90-6588)
(focusing on funding inequalities and resource deprivations of historically Black insti-
tutions); and Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of the Alcorn State University
National Alumni Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, U.S. v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (Nos. 90-1205 and 90-6588) (focusing on the separate,
unequal funding of land grant institutions).
23. The Court did leave open a ve-y small window for arguing for more resources.
505 U.S. at 743 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
24. Mississippi Desegregation Suit Settled for $500 Million, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2001, at Al.
25. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
26. Id. at 270.
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exercising their constitutional rights.27 In Bray, the mismatch be-
tween awareness and law is stark. And, the Bray decision did not, of
course, eliminate the conflict or the awareness of the problem for wo-
men. Legal strategies simply shifted. 28
Those who would maintain disadvantages for gender or racial
groups certainly understand the importance of awareness. Devices
used to maintain the status quo are typically directed at obstructing
awareness. For example, slaveholders knew that their ability to
maintain the institution of slavery depended on their success in iso-
lating individual slaves from each other and from their history. We
conventionally think of slavery as depending largely on enforced bar-
riers to some relationships with more privileged or more "human"
others.29 But in creating conditions under which slaves can "be no
party to... the association of those possessing free will, power, [and]
discretion,"30 slavery also was structured to deprive slaves of the abil-
ity to enter into and participate in relationships with other slaves. In
the United States, family members were not only physically sepa-
rated from each other, but education was also restricted; slaves were
not permitted to engage in or even to speak of collective action; oppor-
tunities to develop a collective sense of history were taken away; and
the ability of slaves to develop a sense of cultural identity was re-
pressed. 31 In other words, the institution of slavery was maintained,
27. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §8A (1965) ("The word intent ...
denote[s] that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he be-
lieves that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it").
28. The law at issue in Bray was 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000), and the Court deter-
mined that the defendants did not have the class-based animus required for liability
under the law (even assuming that the law extended protection to women as a group).
Bray, 506 U.S. at 269. Legal strategies for women then shifted to make use of other
statutes. See, e.g., National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)
(discussing RICO claims).
29. Martin Luther King, Jr., Slavery Makes Individuals Exiles in Their Own
Land, The March on Washington Address (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
READER: WORDS THAT MOVED A NATION 331 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1990) (slavery makes
individuals exiles in their own land). See also JAMAICA KiNCAID, A SMALL PLACE 31
(1989) (speaking of people who are orphans in their own homeland); ROBERT FOGEL,
WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 396-400
(1989).
30. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 477 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring).
31. FOGEL, supra note 29. See also HANNAH CRAFTS, THE BoNDwoMAN'S NARRA-
TIVE (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 2002) (emphasizing that marriage was impossible
for a slave to contemplate); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITA-
BLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 3 (1990) (arguing slavery's essential evil inhered




in substantial part, through denials of awareness to African
Americans.
32
Over the years, scholars have taken note of the centrality of
awareness to civil rights disputes. Consciousness-raising, for exam-
ple, has been an important approach to changing law and political
systems.3 3 Arguments that courts should take the perceptions of
members of racial or gender groups into account in resolving particu-
lar disputes bring awareness into legal debate.3 4 Recognition of the
power inherent in the ability to name a problem consistently with
one's awareness has been an important theme of those who study so-
cial and political change.3 5 The Nobel Prize-winning economist Ken-
neth Boulding suggested some time ago that one might find a cross-
disciplinary theory of all conflicts on the concept of awareness. 36 He
defined conflict as "a situation of competition in which the parties are
aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in
32. The South American educator Paolo Freire has a special word - conscientiza-
qdo - for the state of awareness denied by dominant groups. PAOLO FREIRE, THE
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 19 (1986). Freire argues that denial dehumanizes op-
pressed groups, id. at 28, 36, 76-77, and incapacitates them from demanding change.
Id. at 19, 54. Freire thinks of members of oppressed groups as ultimate "insiders,"
buried so far in the depths of the prevailing wisdoms and society that they cannot be
seen as individuals. Id. at 61. Many minority writers explore the invisibility that
results from gaps in awareness of dominant groups, and of how that invisibility af-
fects a sense of time. Ralph Ellison, for example, says that invisibility "gives one a
slightly different sense of time ... Sometimes you're ahead and sometimes behind...
slipp[ing] into the breaks and look[ing] around." RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 8
(1990). Patricia Williams draws a similar connection between invisibility and a sense
of history: "There are days when I feel so invisible that I can't remember what day of
the week it is." PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAw PROFESSOR 228 (1991).
33. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY]; CATHARINE A. MACKIN-
NON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACK-
INNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARv. L. REV. 829 (1990).
34. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993). Much argument focuses on the advan-
tages of incorporating non-traditional narratives into law. See Kim Lane Scheppele,
Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
35. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS (1990); FREIRE, supra note 32;
BUMILLER, supra note 15; John Stone, Power, Ethnicity, and Conflict, 12A STUD. IN L.,
POL. & Soc'Y. 89 (1992); J. HOCKER & W. WILMOT, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT (1985);
PAUL WEHR, CONFLICT REGULATION (1979); Yngvesson, supra note 15.
36. BOULDING, supra note 13, at 2 ("It is my contention that there is a general
theory of conflict that can be derived from many different sources and disciplines").
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which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible
with the wishes of the other."
37
Fundamental disagreements about whether a problem should be
seen and labeled as a problem of race or gender discrimination are
essential features of civil rights struggles. If one carefully assesses
any discrimination dispute, one will see at its heart a disagreement
about awareness, about how a particular problem ought to be de-
fined, about what should be perceived as "natural" or "normal" and
what should be perceived as a problem that needs to be addressed.
38
Some degree of power will necessarily be yielded whenever a new
awareness is incorporated into society's legal or other institutions.
39
Dominant groups naturally will tend to resist relinquishing power in
this manner. They will have an interest in remaining color-blind or
gender-blind 40 - in the most negative sense - clinging obliviously to
their own stereotyped view of the world, despite the validity of the
competing awareness of race or gender discrimination. Therein lies
the discrimination conflict.
II. THE GROUP PRESENCE IN AwARENESS AND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE FOR MEDIATION
No discrimination dispute is merely an individual dispute. An
awareness of a problem of race or gender discrimination necessarily
brings the race or gender group into the conflict in ways that cannot
be ignored.
Awareness of discrimination almost inevitably commences as an
awareness of personal injustice, which provides the anger and energy
that cause an individual to refuse to be resigned to a particular situa-
tion. 41 This is the type of anger that causes an African-American law
37. Id. at 5.
38. MERRY, supra note 35, at 5. See also William L.F. Felstiner, et al., The Emer-
gence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming... , 15 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 631, 633-35 (1980) (disputes arise when an experience is perceived as inju-
rious and is transformed by naming it as such); Yngvesson, supra note 15, at 1691
(discussing the power of being in a position to "contriv[e] reality").
39. Domination is "inherent in the ability of some to construct authoritative pic-
tures of the way things are." MERRY, supra note 35, at ix. See also Sally Engle Merry,
The Discourses of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1
(1990).
40. LESLIE G. CARR, "COLOR-BLIND" RACIsM (1997) (discussing how colorblindness
perpetuates race hierarchies).
41. See, e.g., SHKLAR, supra note 16, at 90 (noting that "[u]npredicted, sudden
injustices are resented far more intensely than those one has learned to endure as a
member of a group. They tear away the emotional protection created by resignation
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professor, jostled and pushed from the sidewalk by adolescent whites,
to:
Snatch[ ] off my brown silk headrag, my flag of African feminin-
ity and propriety, my sign of meek and supplicatory place and
presentation . . . [to] release[] the armored rage of my short
nappy hair (the scalp gleaming bare between the angry wire
spikes) and [to] hiss[ ]: "Don't I exist for you? See me! And de-
flect, godammit!
42
It is anger against a specific injustice, like the imprisonment that
produced Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Letter From Birmingham
Jail."
43
That awareness commences as a personal injustice, however,
should not obscure the intrinsic group nature of the injustice. Of
course, a racial or gender group frequently becomes directly and for-
mally involved in discrimination disputes. Its involvement may re-
sult from widespread, community-based civil rights organizing or
because a particular incident of discrimination makes it impossible
for the group to ignore a pattern of behavior.44 Retaliatory reactions
of others to individual complaints of discrimination also may pull the
group into a conflict.45 If a discriminatory event occurs in a work-
place, groups representing race or gender interests may quickly be-
come involved in the dispute. 46 Especially when an individual is
represented by a sophisticated or public interest attorney, the group
and allow distress to burst from its confines."); id. at 38, 111 (discrimination is first
experienced as a personal fraud, an assault on personal truth).
42. WILLIAMS, supra note 32, at 235.
43. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Bir-
mingham, and Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 835 (1993). For
personal accounts of discrimination, especially the Rosa Parks story, see also BUMIL-
LER, supra note 15 passim, and at 48.
44. See Interview by Heidi Burgess et al. with Efrain Martinez, Mediator, Com-
munity Relations Service, in Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at http:/!
www.colorado.edu/conflict/civil rights/interviews/EfrainMartinez.html; Interview by
Heidi Burgess et al. with Bob Hughes, Mediator, Community Relations Service, in
Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/
civil rights/interviews/BobHughes.html (describing the reaction of the African
American community to the shooting of a young Black man in Anchorage). See also
Ricigliano et al., supra note 3 (describing Springfield, Massachusetts, and the way in
which a specific incident served as a tipping point to bring festering concerns to the
surface); Warfield, supra note 3 (discussing triggering incidents).
45. STEPHEN L. LONGENECKER, SELMA'S PEACEMAKER: RALPH SMELTZER AND
CIVIL RIGHTS MEDIATION 35 (1987) (describing a threat to fire all black employees
regardless of whether they were involved in civil rights demonstrations).
46. Garcia, supra note 11; Sturm, supra note 3; Yelnosky, supra note 3.
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may formally enter the picture.4 7 But it is not inappropriate to think
about all discrimination disputes - even those in which the group is
not a formal party - as involving a "social enterprise" because of the
inherent group presence.
4
The more familiar links between individual and group in dis-
crimination conflicts are straightforward. For one thing, race or gen-
der discrimination poses a risk to all members of the group, although
in a given instance, it might affect only a single member.4 9 Individ-
ual acts of discrimination are arbitrary and unpredictable. For exam-
ple, any given victim of gender discrimination is frequently a single
woman - among all women exposed to the pervasive risk of discrimi-
nation - who happens to have been at the wrong place at the wrong
time. Thus, even one act of discrimination against a single individual
affects all members of the group; it reminds every member of the
group that the risk of discrimination is pervasive and that each is a
potential target of discrimination.50 Although a discriminatory act
may inflict personal injustice, it also resonates in awareness as a
problem with group dimensions.
Furthermore, the typical ways of resolving individual discrimi-
nation disputes bring the racial or gender group into the picture. The
47. See, e.g., CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RE-
LATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY (1995); Eskridge, supra note 15;
Yelnosky, supra note 3; William Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Dis-
putes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J.
1623 (1997); Susan Sturm, Lawyers at the Prison Gates: Organizational Structure
and Corrections Advocacy, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1993).
48. Rubenstein, supra note 47, at 1632.
49. See Karst, supra note 6 (discussing the imposition of a group identity on vic-
tims of racial discrimination). Courts recognize the inherent class effects and nature
of civil rights claims. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
(1977); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Printing Indus. of Metro. Wash-
ington, D.C., 92 F.R.D. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1981); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139
F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1992). For general discussion of this issue and the related ques-
tion of the adequacy of class representation, see DEBORAH R. HENSLER, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000) (discussing the history
of class action rules); and Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms:
Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990)
(reviewing STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987)). Policies of administrative agencies reflect a similar under-
standing. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability for Sexual Favorit-
ism (1990), reprinted in BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw app. 2, at 656 (1992); EEOC Policy Guidance on
Current Issues of Sexual Harassment (1990), reprinted in id. app. 3, at 661.
50. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 33; cf SHKLAR, supra
note 16, at 49 (much of the power of injustice stems from its arbitrariness).
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group would, of course, be taken into account if remedies were in-
tended to respond to a pattern or practice of conduct that is acknowl-
edged to have affected the group per se. But even remedies intended
only as a meaningful response to individual discrimination will often
directly affect the group. The only good protection against workplace
discrimination in promotions, for example, may consist of a procedu-
ral change in personnel policies or decisionmaking processes. Good
protection for an individual may consist of remedies that curtail the
conduct of a particular individual who is in a position of authority
over a group. For example, if a sexual harassment dispute is resolved
in such a way that the harasser loses (or retains) his position of
power, all members of the group are affected. Experienced mediators
have a keen understanding of the remedial connection between indi-
vidual and group. They know that some remedies will only be en-
forced if the group is willing to assist in the voluntary compliance on
which mediation relies, and that recalcitrant groups can sabotage the
effectiveness of agreements reached by individual disputants. 51
Remedies will often have more indirect group effects as well. In-
formal settlements establish norms that control behavior within
given environments. 52 Even if a resolution directly affects only one
individual, it will set a standard that indirectly governs expectations
and behavior of others in the group. If complaints of discrimination
are handled carelessly or are not taken seriously, the entire group
will receive a message about what behaviors are permissible. 53 If a
settlement is handled secretly, norms of behavior may be interpreted
as permitting problematic behavior, such as harassment. 54 Informal
resolutions or settlements even build the foundation for future
51. For examples of specific ways in which mediated solutions may not properly
respond to group interests and the consequences of neglecting to take a group into
account, see DWIGHT G. GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES
FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 130-32 (1996) (discussing how affected outsiders can
sabotage a mediation); Gourlay & Soderquist, supra note 1, at 280; Linda Stamato,
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Is Mediation an Appropriate Forum?, 10 MED.
Q. 167 (1991); and Interview by Heidi Burgess et al. with Silke Hansen, Mediator,
Community Relations Service, in Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at
http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/civil-rights/interviews/SilkeHansen.html [hereinaf-
ter Hansen Interview] ("My concern wasn't to advocate for the community, but if
those issues weren't brought to the table, that would undermine the effectiveness of
any agreement").
52. Yngvesson, supra note 15; Sturm, supra note 3.
53. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation
of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & Soc'Y REV. 497, 530 (1993) (the way com-
plaints are handled will affect the climate for all).
54. Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Ac-
countability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 523 (1991); Silver, supra note 2, at 524.
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changes in legal doctrine or legal remedies, which will affect the
group. 55 Although the legal literature explores the difficulties of rec-
onciling intra-group interests when a group is a formal party to a
dispute,56 there is little if any recognition of this issue as it pertains
to the mediation of individual discrimination disputes. 57 The gap in
the literature is unfortunate, for the group presence in an individual
discrimination dispute is sufficiently strong that an individual can
actually be said to be involved in more than one negotiation, as she
tries to find an appropriate response to discrimination.
In the workplace, for example, an individual disputant must find
a way of successfully renegotiating her relationship with the immedi-
ate agent of discrimination and those persons whose conduct - collec-
tively, formally or informally - sets workplace norms that trigger or
permit discriminatory events. The relationship with the larger work-
place community is probably of central importance, for the immediate
agent is rarely a workplace pariah or a rogue actor at the fringes of
accepted workplace norms. The agent likely enjoys some status and
protection within the larger workplace community, and a person who
has suffered discrimination cannot afford to ignore this reality. To do
so will invite informal retaliation and isolation. Mediation with the
immediate agent of discrimination is frequently, in the modern work-
place and with respect to "second generation" discrimination, 58
merely a proxy for mediation with the larger workplace community.
In addition, the individual disputant will need to find a way of
successfully sustaining a relationship with the racial or gender
55. See Yngvesson, supra note 15, at 1693 (local practice and popular conscious-
ness foster the development of law); Burt Neuborne & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., A
Prelude to the Settlement of Wilder, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177 (settlements can have
some precedential value, especially if they are not secret).
56. See generally Rubenstein, supra note 47. See also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race
as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial
Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003) (discussing differences within the African-
American community regarding the Atlanta desegregation litigation); Menkel-
Meadow, Dismantling the Master's House, supra note 3, at 1424 (recognizing differ-
ences between women of different racial or ethnic groups); Leti Volpp,
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense" 17 HARv. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 57 (1994) (the local group of women affected by a single employer differs
from the abstract, global group of all women); LONGENECKER, supra note 45 (African
Americans have different ideas about optimal solutions).
57. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 3, at 753 (pointing out that a criminal defense
attorney might advance a cultural defense in mitigation of punishment that stigma-
tizes the defendant's group as "subcultural, violent, or bizarre"), discussing Peter
Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal
Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 53-54 (1998).
58. Sturm, supra note 3.
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group. An individual who raises a complaint of discrimination has
identified herself with a racial or gender group, and her relationship
with the group will not be of merely intellectual interest. She will
likely be consulting informally with friends and family about her pre-
dicament or, perhaps, she will be consciously aware of the real-world
implications of being formally associated with a given identity group.
The individual disputant's need to bring into balance these two
relationships - with a racial or gender group and with the larger,
workplace community - has significant practical ramifications. 59 She
will need to clarify what race or gender signifies for her in relation to
the group with which she is associated. She will expend significant
energies trying to reconcile her immediate, personal needs - mea-
sured by tangible things like salary or promotion - with her loyalty to
the group. She will know that personal survival sometimes depends
on neglecting her group and that she may pay a price for not accom-
modating her needs to the norms of the larger, workplace commu-
nity.60 On the other hand, she will understand that the long-term
success of her struggle may rest on her refusal to neglect the group.
Whether through explicit acknowledgement of or engagement
only through internal struggle, individual discrimination disputants
are, in effect, involved in a mediation with two different collectivities:
the racial or gender group and the larger, workplace community. 61
Thus, the individual disputant will constantly be recalibrating her
approach to these two groups, sometimes choosing to forcefully chal-
lenge and compete with the norms of the larger community, some-
times opting for cooperation. 6
2
59. For general discussions of how individuals in society struggle with this ten-
sion, see Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1992) (discussing the need
to reconcile the public and the private self); and BOULDING, supra note 13, at 172-73
(defining the choice between peer group and other group). For discussions applicable
to civil rights disputes, see BUMILLER, supra note 15, at 84-88; and Howard Gadlin,
Careful Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 139, 145 (1991).
60. See, e.g., Balc, supra note 1, at 261 (discussing retaliation against persons
who complained about sexual harassment in the Los Angeles County Sheriffs
Department).
61. See BUMILLER, supra note 15, at 83, 93, for examples of what happens when
the struggle remains internal or is suppressed.
62. The choice between competition and cooperation, or between contesting and
conforming, is a theme in mediation literature. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ac-
cess to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: When Litigation is Not the Only
Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 37, 50 (2002); Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs & Denise H. Lach, Workplace
Dispute Resolution and Gender Inequality, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 187 (1991), although the
implications of the choice in discrimination disputes have not been fully explored.
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In disputes in which gender or race is a factor, the entire history
of discrimination becomes relevant to these two struggles. For exam-
ple, members of racial minorities tend to think of incidents of racism
as being part of a history of structural, pervasive racism rather than
as aberrational, isolated events. 63 Personal injustice may be a "trig-
gering" event, but it taps into and is informed by an understanding of
social structures and hierarchies that have historically operated
against groups. 64 Racism is clearly seen as Douglass' "old snake,"
which has taken different forms at different times but can surely be
trusted to reappear in a different skin.65 That is why experienced
civil rights mediators believe that an understanding of history is an
essential attribute of an effective mediator.
66
Although members of the larger community might wish to see
individual incidents of racism or sexism as aberrant, their reactions
to complaints of discrimination frequently reveal that they, too, are
aware that an individual incident is part of an historical continuum.
For example, persons whose institutions and world-views are chal-
lenged in a discrimination dispute understand that even disputes
seemingly focused on small problems can have huge ramifications
and inevitable spillover effects. They know that any resolution of a
particular problem in favor of women or minorities will tend to vali-
date or augment the awareness of a gender or racial group and will
63. See Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution, Cultural Differences, and the Cul-
ture of Racism, 10 NEG. J. 33, 38 (1994).
64. See Warfield, supra note 3.
65. See Douglass, supra note 14.
66. See Interview by Heidi Burgess et al. with Werner Petterson, Mediator, Com-
munity Relations Service, in Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at http://
www.colorado.edu/conflict/civil-rights/interviews/WernerPetterson.html (to be an ef-
fective civil rights mediator, "you have to be a historian"); Interview by Heidi Burgess
and Dana Johnson with Will Reed, Field Representative, Community Relations Ser-
vice, in Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at http://www.colorado.edu/con
flict/civil-rights/interviews/WillReed.html (to be effective, "you have to know what
people have historically gone through about certain things. You also have to be aware
of some areas of history."); Hansen Interview supra note 51 (to be an effective civil
rights mediator, "you need an understanding of the history ... not just the problem in
its current form ... You may know a young black person in your church whose par-
ents might be richer than you are, and you can't understand why he's still discontent.
For many white people, it's difficult to understand how the life of a person of color is
shaped not just by his or her own personal history, but the history of his or her peo-
ple.") Cf Richard A. Salem, Mediation as An Alternative to Civil Rights Litigation, in
DISCRETION, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 90, 96 (Carl F.
Pinkele & William C. Louthran eds., 1985) (touting mediation for its capacity to take
history into account); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for




increase the future risk to the foundations of all dominant institu-
tions and norms. In the early 1800s, for example, congressional de-
fenders of slavery feared that Congress' simple act of receiving
petitions against slavery would indirectly acknowledge the right of
African Americans to demand inclusion in the political community.
They therefore vigorously resisted not merely the substance but also
the receipt of the petitions.67 More recently, the white community in
Montgomery, Alabama, rejected one of the first proposals for resolv-
ing the Montgomery bus boycott despite the fact that the proposal
would have substantially preserved racial segregation. It understood
that even a minor inroad into the system of racial segregation would
pose a significant future threat to the system as a whole. 68
Thus, both discrimination complainants and their opponents
think in historical terms, which draws in group identity. But it is the
complainants with which this Article is concerned, for their sense of
group history and predicament means that individual disputants will
see beyond their individual complaint. At some level, all discrimina-
tion disputes entail a quintessentially human struggle of people to
secure themselves in history.69 In A Small Place, Jamaica Kincaid
describes this phenomenon. 70 She ascribes the subservient state of
African Antiguans in part to the absence of a sense of history that
would draw them beyond the personal, the trivial, and the daily
event.71 Confronting a frustratingly persistent powerlessness, she
asks:
And might not knowing why they are the way they are, why
they do the things they do, why they live the way they live and
in the place they live, why the things that happened to them
happened, lead these people to a different relationship with the
world, a more demanding relationship, a relationship in which
they are not victims all the time of every bad idea that flits
across the mind of the world?
72
The way in which group history is wrapped up in individual dis-
crimination complaints will be viewed as problematic if one believes
that a focus on past history necessarily gets in the way of thinking
67. See Emily M. Calhoun, Voice in Government: The People, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 427 (1994).
68. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63 146 (1988).
69. See FREIRE, supra note 32, at 88 (individuals who have awareness exist in
"historical space").
70. See KINCAID, supra note 29.
71. See id. at 53-57.
72. Id. at 56-57.
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constructively about solutions to a problem. 73 If, for example, a dis-
putant takes into account group history, she will inevitably consider
"collective sentiments, historical memories, political myths . . . and
traditions of racism,"74 all of which may interfere with a pragmatic,
problem-solving perspective. But group history also offers a dispu-
tant an opportunity to take into account whatever "history of consen-
sus" and tolerance may exist in relations between her group and the
larger community. 75 If these latter experiences are included in an
account of group history, group history will not drive the dispute nec-
essarily toward division.
In addition, group history is simply too important to remedial
choice and self-determination objectives to be ignored in a discrimi-
nation dispute. One must remember that an individual disputant is
involved in a negotiation about more than one group relationship.
She cannot identify an appropriate remedial relationship with the
larger community without also simultaneously reaching a clear un-
derstanding about her relationship with her racial or gender group.
Although individuals will value their relationship to the group, its
history, and its future differently, 76 effacing the group presence from
a discrimination dispute - and insisting that only the disputant's re-
lationship with the larger community is worthy of attention - must
be viewed as a distortion of the dispute and its remedial options. In-
dividual disputants need an opportunity to consider all of the rela-
tionships inherent in a discrimination dispute to enable them to
make good choices about remedies.
Furthermore, isolating a person from a group with which she
chooses to identify herself is, in discrimination disputes, a real
harm.77 Discrimination is not slavery, and slavery is not mere dis-
crimination, but the previous discussion on the harms and essential
73. Cf. infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
74. Stone, supra note 35, at 95.
75. Warfield, supra note 3, at 152.
76. See Gadlin, supra note 63, at 37 (different people will give different weights
to group and individual identity).
77. The freedom to enter into fruitful, productive human relationships of one's
choice is a basic human right. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77
WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002); Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom
of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964). The larger community that resists changes in
relationships portended by a new awareness frequently moun ts general and direct
attacks on the humanity of outsiders, characterizing them as evil, deviant, or abnor-
mal in some way. See, e.g., Terrell A. Northrup, The Dynamic of Identity in Personal
and Social Conflict, in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55 (Louis
Kriesberg et al. eds., 1989); KINCAID, supra note 29, at 26-34; BUMILLER, supra note
15, at 73-74; Evan Wolfson, Civil Rights, Human Rights, Gay Rights: Minorities and
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evils of slavery shows that isolating an individual from the group
with which she chooses to identify is more than a trivial harm.78 If a
mediation process appears to insist on the same individual-group iso-
lation that historically has been used to deprive minority groups of
autonomy, the process itself will be deficient. When an individual
has an awareness of group history, she begins to become more than "a
good nobody,"7 9 is empowered to make truly informed and autono-
mous choices about her fate,8 0 and is better able to resist becoming a
passive victim "of every bad idea that flits across the mind of the
world."8 1 Mediators should recognize that a process that does not
take into account the individual-group relationship, including group
history, will validate arguments that mediation is about something
other than self-determination.
In thinking about how mediation processes might be adapted to
better respond to discrimination disputes, it is important to recognize
that an awareness of the group presence in an individual discrimina-
tion dispute is a high value state of being, not a pathology.8 2 If the
the Humanity of the Different, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (1991). The most ex-
treme example of dehumanization is the decision to treat people as property under
law. See, e.g., ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE U.S. SOUTH 202 (1992).
78. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
79. KINCAID, supra note 29, at 55. For discussion of the relationship between
empowerment and group identification, see Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A
Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 WIs. L. REV. 105 (1993). Inso-
far as tangible links to the group develop out of that awareness, the group is an inval-
uable source of strength. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. As the
Supreme Court has said, "[b]y collective effort individuals can make their views
known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost." Citizens Against Rent
Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981); DAVID FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (Univ. of Chicago Press 1968) (recalling Tocqueville's observa-
tion that associations are particularly important as protections against tyranny of the
majority and abuse of political power).
80. Empowerment can signify many things, but in this Article it refers to the
capacity to make free and meaningful choices about mediation processes and out-
comes. In this respect, it serves mediation's primary goal of self-determination. See
supra note 8. Of course, a lot of things can affect power in dispute resolution
processes. See, e.g., Michelle R. Evans, Women and Mediation: Toward a Formula-
tion of an Interdisciplinary Empirical Model to Determine Equity in Dispute Resolu-
tion, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 145 (2001) (discussing power effects of gender
differences in negotiating styles); Sara Cobb, Empowerment and Mediation: A Narra-
tive Perspective, 9 NEG. J. 245 (1993) (describing the relationship between the oppor-
tunities for a party to speak from a position of power and the coherence of that party's
narrative); Gadlin, supra note 63, at 37 (noting factors that bear on power).
81. KINCAID, supra note 29, at 57.
82. Delgado, supra note 2; and BOULDING, supra note 13, at 308. This Article
does not address the issue of whether conflict, in some or all of its manifestations, is
pathological. The point here is that awareness and recognition of a group presence
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race or gender group relationship is by intent or carelessness ne-
glected, mediation will not fulfill its promise. On the other hand, if
given an opportunity to grapple with her relationship to her peer
group as well as to the larger community, an individual disputant
will be in a good position to take advantage of what mediation has to
offer. The trick is to find a practical way of ensuring that mediation
processes do not ignore the group presence. Indeed, the task is to
find a way of affirmatively cultivating the group presence and the
awareness of the connection between individual and group.
III. HONORING AWARENESS AND THE GROUP PRESENCE IN
MEDIATION: A PROCESS SUGGESTION
This Article proposes that mediators consciously use first-phase,
private caucuses in individual discrimination disputes. The express
purpose of doing so would be to explore and enhance awareness of the
group presence for the discrimination claimant.8 3 The first-phase
caucus 8 4 would thus prepare an individual disputant to participate
as an effective problem-solver and empowered bargainer in the
mediation.
A standard critique of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
processes is that they tend to ignore the class basis of many types of
certainly is not pathological, and that these features of an individual discrimination
dispute are worth not only preserving but nurturing.
83. Yelnosky, supra note 3, at 617, proposes that the group ought to formally be
brought into the dispute as a party and discusses ways it might ethically be accom-
plished. Although introducing the formal group might ensure that discrimination dis-
putes do not ignore "public goods," id. at 610-11, or ensure that important
stakeholders are not omitted, GRAY, supra note 11, at 262, the proposal in this Article
does not deal directly with these or other interesting issues, for example, whether the
formal presence of a group will come to dominate the individual dispute. Cf Ruben-
stein, supra note 47, at 1672-73 (asking what would be the status and right of partici-
pation of a group that is a formal party to litigation).
84. Courts also employ a special procedure to respond to the formal group pres-
ence in class action settlements. See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, Fairness and Finality:
Third-Party Challenges to Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees After the
1991 Civil Rights Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 321 (1993); Maimon Schwarzschild, Public
Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated
Institutional Reform, 1984 DuKE L.J. 897, 909-34 (discussing the use of fairness hear-
ings to avoid perceptions of procedural unfairness). Fairness hearings are typically
held after the primary disputing parties have proposed concrete solutions to a prob-
lem. They come too late in the process to serve some objectives, such as offering a
realistic opportunity for third parties to identify constructive suggestions that might
improve settlement options. In contrast, the first-phase, private caucus introduces
the group presence at an early stage of the proceedings.
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conflicts.8 5 For persons who believe this to be the case, one option is
simply to avoid ADR.8 6 This Article eschews the categorical avoid-
ance option. Instead, it searches for a way to bring the group into the
mediation process in a constructive way, even if race or gender is only
a background or unspoken factor when a discrimination dispute first
surfaces.
Mediation literature cautions against cultivating group identity
in discrimination conflicts. When group identity dominates a conflict,
some mediators argue that disputants are locked into a choreo-
graphed dance governed by set expectations, in which everyone plays
a predetermined role.87 Some mediators may believe that group
identity merely perpetuates conflict.88 Some may worry that dispu-
tants who link themselves to a particular group are vulnerable if the
group itself is associated with negative gender or racial stereotypes.8 9
These are not trivial concerns, but are overblown in many discus-
sions of mediation, even when a group is a formal party to the media-
tion.90 Some mediators have experience dealing with the complexity
of group identity issues when a group is a formal party to a media-
tion.91 And there are benefits to group identity that do not necessa-
rily confound the possibility of consensus. For example, members of
race-based or gender-based workplace identity committees can reap
significant benefits from group identification without sacrificing their
ties to the larger community. 92 Indeed, participants in such commit-
tees seem to affirmatively desire not to sever ties with dominant com-
munities. 93 The fear that the group presence will necessarily stand
85. Scholarly critiques of ADR hold that ADR ignores the group. See, e.g., Del-
gado et al., supra note 2, at 1397; Yngvesson, supra note 15, at 1706; Edelman et al.,
supra note 53, at 502, 504; Silver, supra note 2; cf Rubenstein, supra note 47 (discuss-
ing a similar problem in litigation).
86. See, e.g., Delgado et al., supra note 2, at 1403-04; Matt A. Mayer, The Use of
Mediation in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1999 J. Disp. RESOL. 153, 171 (1999).
87. See Gadlin, supra note 63, at 35-36; Cobb, supra note 80, at 251 (discussing
how conflict narratives become entrenched).
88. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and
Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2002); Yelnosky, supra note 3, at 618;
Marc Howard Ross, Ethnic Conflict and Dispute Management: Addressing Interests
and Identities, 12 SUD. IN L., POL., & Soc'Y 107, 110 (1992).
89. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 70, 76-77.
90. For a discussion of both advantages and disadvantages of introducing the
group into mediation, see Yelnosky, supra note 3, at 617-20.
91. In addition to the sources cited throughout this Article, see Oral History Pro-
ject, at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/civil rights.
92. See Garcia, supra note 11, at 83-84.
93. See id. at 119-20.
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in the way of consensus ignores the fact that groups share a history of
living together as well as of disputing with one another.
9 4
Moreover, mediation literature focuses on the difficulties group
identity creates in joint bargaining sessions, when opponents are at-
tempting to work cooperatively toward a solution.9 5 The proposal in
this Article pertains to private caucuses, where temporarily cultivat-
ing the group presence before joint bargaining begins is a construc-
tive act. In the first-phase caucus, the group presence can serve
mediation's goals of promoting good problem-solving and self-deter-
mination. And it can do so without reinforcing opponents who may
act on the basis of negative group stereotypes and without so intensi-
fying the driving force of a conflict that mediation is no longer
possible.
Holding separate, confidential caucuses with only one party to a
dispute is not a revolutionary idea in mediation. 9 6 Indeed, one trea-
tise on mediation asserts that caucuses are the distinctive feature of
mediation and the setting where most of the important work of medi-
ation is accomplished. 9 7 Early caucusing is viewed as especially help-
ful in race-based community disputes, as illustrated by a series of
interviews conducted by the University of Colorado Conflict Research
Consortium with mediators from the Community Relations Service of
the United States Department of Justice ("CRS"). 9s CRS mediators
routinely meet individually and confidentially with community
groups prior to commencing the formal mediation between adversa-
ries. Some mediators describe the meetings as "coaching" sessions. 99
94. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Gunning, supra note 2, at 76-77.
96. For descriptions of the traditional caucus and its objectives, see MOORE,
supra note 11, at 262-71. Other useful commentary on caucuses may be found in
GoLANN, supra note 51, at 68-73 and J. Michael Keating, Jr., In Mediation, Caucus
Can Be a Powerful Tool, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 85 (1996).
97. GoLANN, supra note 51, at 68 (emphasis added); see also Keating, supra note
96, at 85 ("The caucus is one of the mediator's most powerful tools for moving parties
toward settlement.").
98. See Oral History Project, supra note 91. See also Ricigliano et al., supra note
3, at 96 (describing early use of caucuses and meetings to deal with racial tensions
within a given community); Warfield, supra note 3, at 155-56 (early planning is essen-
tial in community racial conflicts).
99. See Interview by Heidi Burgess et al. with Nancy Ferrell, former Conciliation





Others think of them as an opportunity to provide technical assis-
tance. 100 In these caucuses, ground rules for the mediation with op-
posing parties are set.10 1 Mediators help groups "identify what their
interests and concerns are . . ., what they hope to get out of [the]
process,"' 0 2 and to understand that they need "a good agenda".' 0 3 As
one CRS mediator puts it, the group needs "to be very clear about...
concerns.., and they need to be definable... [and] stated in a way
that they can be resolved.' 0 4 CRS mediation practices are consistent
with those in routine mediations, where mediators use first-phase
caucuses to decide if mediation is possible, 10 5 to probe for potential
obstacles to settlement, 0 6 to gather information, 0 7 to help a specific
party think creatively and clearly about priorities and objectives in
mediation, 0 8 or to educate a party on the ins and outs of mediation
processes.109
In an individual discrimination dispute, however, the group is by
definition not a formal party to the mediation. Its presence is figura-
tive, virtual. Under these circumstances, one may legitimately ask
what it means to use a first-phase caucus to cultivate the group pres-
ence in the mediation of an individual discrimination dispute.
To state what is perhaps the obvious, a mediator's first step to-
ward cultivating the group presence must be to avoid suppressing a
group presence that is obviously a factor in a dispute. Many
mediators who work in the civil rights field acknowledge, de facto, the
group presence by, for example, using teams of mediators represent-
ing different racial or gender groups. 10 In the workplace, more or
less formal identity groups may already be a background factor taken
into account in processing individual grievances."' But there is evi-
dence that some mediators suppress the group presence when it does
100. Hansen Interview, supra note 51.
101. See Ferrell Interview, supra note 99.
102. Hansen Interview, supra note 51. See also Warfield, supra note 3, at 160.
103. Interview by Heidi Burgess et al. with Dick Salem, former Regional Director,
Community Relations Service, in Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at
http://www.colorado.edu/conflictcivil rights/interviews/DickSalem.html.
104. Ferrell Interview, supra note 99.
105. GRAY, supra note 11, at 167-68.
106. GOLANN, supra note 51, at 70.
107. See Keating, supra note 96, at 85.
108. See id.; GRAY, supra note 11, at 170 (meetings help groups get organized).
109. See Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets, supra note 2, at 1905
(crediting Lawrence Susskind for the use of caucuses to train parties in negotiation).
110. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 88-89; see also Garcia, supra note 11, at 160
(suggesting use of identity caucus members as third party mediators in intra-union
disputes).
111. See Garcia, supra note 11; Sturm, supra note 3, at 530-31.
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appear in order to guard against its intrusion into the individual dis-
pute. Suppression, for example, may be a particular problem when
internal mediators are asked by organizations to handle workplace
disputes. Under these circumstances, mediators will have some obli-
gation to serve institutional interests, 112 one of which may be simply
to avoid litigation. 1 3 This objective is frequently best served by nar-
rowing the dispute at all costs. In addition, certain mediation philos-
ophies may tend to encourage suppression of the group presence."
14
Or, suppression may occur simply because a mediator just does not
know what to do with the group presence when it merely "tinges" and
is not at the precise center of the dispute.1 5 To properly make use of
a first-phase caucus in an individual discrimination dispute,
mediators must at the very least resist suppression of an evident
group presence.
But a mediator must do more. Just because an individual is not
speaking openly about the group presence in an individual discrimi-
nation dispute does not mean that the group is absent from the dis-
pute. A mediator must actually look for, probe, and even enhance the
group presence. In other words, she must cultivate it.
The precise mechanisms for cultivating the presence through a
first-phase caucus must be left to individual mediators, but the objec-
tives of cultivating the presence will be the same in every mediation.
First, a mediator will cultivate the group presence to prepare the dis-
putant to be an effective problem-solver. Second, a mediator will cul-
tivate the group presence to prepare the disputant to truly exercise
self-determination with respect to both mediation outcomes and the
joint bargaining process that will occur in mediation. These two
objectives are explored in the following sections.
112. See Edelman et al., supra note 53, at 506-07, 528 (mediators who act on be-
half of institutions are empowered to serve institutional interests and may exert coer-
cion to serve those interests).
113. See Sturm, supra note 3, at 543.
114. These philosophies have received a fair bit of scholarly attention and criti-
cism. See, e.g., Delgado et al., supra note 2 (focusing on restorative justice); Yngves-
son, supra note 15, at 1706, 1708 (therapeutic discourse that creates a relationship
between mediator and party improperly supplants the development of a relationship
between individual and racial group); Ellen Waldman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence/
Preventive Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Substituting Needs for Rights in
Mediation: Therapeutic or Disabling?, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1103, 1111-13 (1999)
(focusing on therapeutic theories of mediation); Fiss, Out of Eden, supra note 2, at
1672 (criticizing the religious perspective embodied in Andrew W. McThenia &
Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985)).
115. Gadlin, supra note 63, at 35.
[Vol. 9:187
Workplace Mediation
A. Cultivating the Group Presence as Preparation for Good
Problem-Solving
In any first-phase caucus, a mediator begins to explore the un-
derlying facts of the dispute, to test how an individual thinks about
the dispute and about her goals in mediation, and to anticipate a
range of potential resolutions for the dispute. 116 In undertaking
these tasks in an individual discrimination dispute, a mediator will
undoubtedly discern the group presence. The only response consis-
tent with a mediator's obligation to identify the real stakes in a dis-
pute so as to arrive at an effective remedy is to confront the group
presence and to permit its implications to be fully explored. A media-
tor must look beyond the individual "triggering incident."
As the previous discussion of the importance of the group pres-
ence to remedies shows, good decisions about remedies may not be
made if the group presence is not fully acknowledged and explored.
Good remedial decisions depend on an accurate understandings of
what is at stake in a dispute and, in an individual discrimination dis-
pute, the following relational interests are at stake: the relationship
with the identity group and the relationship with the larger work-
place community.
Consider, for example, an individual who says that she is inter-
ested in ensuring that what happened to her will not happen to any-
one else, as well as in finding a solution for her own plight.'1 7 This
individual has explicitly expressed a desire for a remedy that strikes
an appropriate remedial balance between her relationship with her
identity group and her relationship with the larger community. Even
when the desire is not openly voiced, however, a need for a similar
remedial balance is inherent in the discrimination dispute. An indi-
vidual discrimination disputant is looking for a remedy that allows
her to satisfy both a need to contest and a need to conform."', The
group presence must be taken into account by a mediator, not be-
cause the group itself deserves consideration for its own benefit," 9
116. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 96, at 85 (in early caucuses, mediators are al-
ready trying to discern the potential structure of a resolution); Balc, supra note 1, at
246 (prior to the mediation, parties must be permitted to assess their situation).
117. See, for example, the woman described in Carol A. Wittenberg et al., Employ-
ment Disputes, in GoLANN, supra note 51, at 461.
118. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119. Whether mediators have ethical obligations to absent third parties is a hotly
debated topic. See Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets, supra note 2, at
1919-20 (examining to what extent mediators bear responsibility for the results of
their mediation sessions).
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but because the relational interests of the individual disputant de-
mand consideration of the group.
In addition, specific remedial solutions will look better or worse
to a given individual, depending on their consequences for the group.
For example, whether a given remedy offers protection to the group
may have quite concrete ramifications for the individual who, after
all, remains a member of the group. If an individual accedes to a
remedy that leaves discriminatory institutions, structures, proce-
dures, or people in place, she may be agreeing to put herself at future
risk. A mediator must tease out the group presence to ensure that
problematic structures, procedures, and people are no longer in a po-
sition to threaten discriminatory harm. 120 Furthermore, some reme-
dies tailored to directly help only the individual will require the
assistance of a group to enforce. And, remedies intended primarily to
benefit an individual may be sabotaged if the group rejects them as
having detrimental effects on group interests. Thus, an accurate as-
sessment of remedial options requires consideration of the group.
To accurately assess remedial options, a mediator may even wish
to bring group representatives into the mediation as non-party con-
sultants - persons who can provide needed information about pat-
terns of conduct and histories of discrimination that will bear on
whether any given remedy will be truly effective. 121 Taking this in-
formation into account may cause a disputant to see a problem in a
new light and to see new remedial options.' 22 Such information
120. The EEOC reportedly fails to uncover patterns and practices of discrimina-
tion when they exist because its mediation process is permitted to focus too exclu-
sively on individuals. See Mayer, supra note 86, at 167; Mark D. Klimek,
Discrimination Claims Under Title VII: Where Mandatory Arbitration Goes Too Far,
8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 425, 435 (1993).
121. See Sturm, supra note 3, at 531-34. Talbot, supra note 12, at 660, cautions,
however, that current employees may not wish to become involved in another's dis-
pute. Just as a mediator might bring in third-party expert witnesses to assist in
resolving a dispute, see SCANLON, supra note 11, at 35-36, so groups might formally be
brought in with this status. Bringing in a group as a third-party expert is, of course,
different from bringing in the group as a formal party, but introducing a group into
the process in any capacity will require a more flexible approach to confidentiality see
Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17
OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 239 (2002) ("The importance of confidentiality is axiomatic in
mediation."), and while statutes may bear on this issue, see id. at 256-74 (discussing
statutory protections), the precise boundaries and terms of confidentiality are open to
negotiation. For a review of some confidentiality issues in mediation see Ellen E.
Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides with Con-
fidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33 (2001); Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Media-
tion: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 25; Maute, supra note 54.
122. See, e.g., Felstiner et al., supra note 38, at 639-40 (the entry of new parties
into a dispute will change the way the dispute is seen). One CRS mediator provides a
214 [Vol. 9:187
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might also give a mediator a better sense of what habits of thought
and behavior, what attitudes of resistance and problem-solving, she
will be dealing with when bargaining begins. 123 And it may help a
mediator identify persons who will be in a position to help in the
practical task of remedial enforcement.
124
Cultivating the group presence in a first-phase caucus can help
ensure that the stakes in mediation are accurately assessed and that
remedies are effectively structured to provide enforceable protection
to the individual. It reinforces a practical, beneficial, problem-solving
mindset. But a mediator will also want to cultivate the group pres-
ence as a way of supporting self-determination in decisions made
about mediation outcomes and processes.
B. Cultivating the Group Presence for Self-Determination in
Outcome and Process
A common critique of mediation processes in discrimination dis-
putes is that they disempower disputants.125 If empowered partici-
pation consists of a disputant's capacity to make free and informed
decisions as to both mediation process and outcome, 126 a first-phase
caucus is a good place to develop or support the capacity through cul-
tivating the group presence.'
27
hypothetical example of how a discrimination dispute may evolve when a disputant
takes into account the existence of a third-party group: Community members initially
focus on getting rid of a school superintendent they perceive as racist. But once the
mediator helps these individuals realize that the School Board, with the responsibil-
ity for hiring and firing the superintendent, might also be part of the problem, they
move to an understanding that structural changes might be required to deal with
entrenched problems of racism. See Hansen Interview, supra note 51.
123. See, e.g., Ricigliano et al., supra note 3, at 113-14 (describing how much work
is done with dominant groups).
124. Pulling in a group gives mediators an opportunity to identify internal
facilitators, see Warfield, supra note 3, and helps build the capacity for continued
struggle against the intractable problem of discrimination, see Ricigliano et al., supra
note 3. Sturm, supra note 3, at 490, considers the capacity for future self-help as one
criterion for determining whether a mediation process is successful. As one CRS me-
diator puts it, ultimately it is the group, not an individual, "that is going to hold the
right people to account." Hansen Interview, supra note 51.
125. See, e.g., SHAILOR, supra note 1, at 7, 13-14; see also Harkavy, supra note 1, at
160-61 (personal empowerment, the ability to control the terms of resolution, is a "rec-
ognition of personhood").
126. See supra note 8. Although I do not agree with all of her conclusions, Cobb,
supra note 80, offers an insightful critique of the empowerment issue in mediation.
127. See Gewurz, supra note 8, at 153 (discussing the need for an early assessment
of relative power). See also Hansen Interview, supra note 51; Interview by Heidi Bur-
gess et al. with Wally Warfield, Mediator, Community Relations Service, in Civil
Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/civil-
rights/interviews/WallyWarfield.html [hereinafter Warfield Interview]; Interview by
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As previous discussions attest, a mediator who cultivates the
group presence will give an individual discrimination disputant the
opportunity to negotiate her relationships with the racial or gender
group and the larger community. Providing this opportunity enables
the disputant to begin to think clearly and coherently about what is
at stake for her and what remedial options will actually serve her
interests. Clarity, sophistication, and coherence of thought in these
respects are the primary protections for self-determination in the me-
diation. 128 For example, how a dispute is initially framed will have a
strong influence on the ultimate agreement. 129 If a disputant has
framed her complaint in a coherent narrative that draws on common
cultural stories that honor all aspects of the group history, she will be
relatively more powerful.' 30 If she has clarity in these respects, she
will be able to better speak without intimidation13' and to better
stick to her goals.' 32 Self-determination is directly related to the
clarity with which individual disputants negotiate their relationships
with both race or gender group and the larger workplace community.
A mediator will also inevitably enhance self-determination by
cultivating the group presence when she explores the exit option that
exists in any discrimination dispute - the right to turn to judicial
processes and legal remedies for group discrimination. 33 Having a
Heidi Burgess et al. with Ozell Sutton, Regional Director, Community Relations Ser-
vice, in Civil Rights Mediation: Oral History Project, at http://www.colorado.edu/con
flict/civil rights/interviews/OzellSutton.html (an assessment of power, and even
power-balancing, needs to be done early in the process).
128. See Cobb, supra note 80, at 251-252.
129. See Greenebaum, supra note 11, at 118 (how the dispute is conceived will
dictate its resolution); Cobb, supra note 80, at 250 (the first narrative frames the
agreement); id. at 253 (a mediator might want to have very early, separate meetings
with parties to explore the narratives).
130. See generally Gunning, supra note 2; Cobb, supra note 80, at 251-252. If dis-
putants know how to frame and think about the dispute, if the real stakes in the
dispute are on the table, and if all interests are properly identified and named, the
more powerful opponent is not free to dominate the framing of issues. See Warfield,
supra note 3; cf. Onora O'Neill, Reason and the Resolution of Disputes, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1992) (outsiders are at a disadvantage in debate because
the terms of the debate are generally set by dominant groups).
131. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 91-92.
132. See Gewurz, supra note 8.
133. There is an increasing acknowledgment that legal rights are likely to be in-
troduced in mediation, and that mediators in certain types of disputes may need some
knowledge of the law, for example, if they are to be called on to assume an evaluative
role. See Harkavy, supra note 1, at 167; Kochan et al., supra note 1, at 275. Even if
not performing an evaluative role, mediators are frequently called on to work closely
with legal counsel to parties, which may require some knowledge of applicable law.
For a good discussion of the lawyer's role in mediation, see Jean R. Sternlight, Law-
yers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to
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clear sense of alternatives to the mediation process empowers any
mediation participant, and the first-phase caucus can be used to ex-
plore these alternatives and to remind disputants that they have a
veto power over any proposed outcome.1 3 4 In a discrimination dis-
pute, the most potent exit option - abandoning mediation in favor of
legal, group discrimination remedies - is necessarily a group exit op-
tion and must be thought of as such.
Some mediators will not wish to talk about the group exit option
and will want to avoid so-called "rights talk" for a variety of reasons,
including its supposed polarizing effects. 1 35 Most concerns about dis-
cussions of rights, however, relate to the joint bargaining process, not
to a first-phase caucus. 136 In a caucus, skilled mediators can help
individual disputants think about group rights and the group exit op-
tion without unduly polarizing a dispute. In this setting, group
rights become simply part of the problem-solving calculus. They are
relevant to a good assessment of what is at stake and of relevant re-
medial options. They may help establish appropriate behavioral and
remedial aspirations, which in turn will enable parties to better artic-
ulate why and where given conduct falls short. Although the mean-
ing of discrimination, group identity, and connection to the larger
community is specific to each individual, no given individual needs to
negotiate this meaning entirely on her own. Insofar as the legal tra-
dition can provide some help in thinking about discrimination, the
legal tradition should be made available to the disputant. 3 7 And, of
course, the legal tradition will include reminders of group ties to the
larger community as well as ways of thinking about single-group
Structure Advocacy in a Non-Adversarial Setting, 14 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 269
(1999).
134. Gewurz, supra note 8, at 153; Evans, supra note 80, at 174; and Weckstein,
supra note 8, at 560-62.
135. See the discussions in, for example, Neal Milner, The Denigration of Rights
and the Persistence of Rights Talk: A Cultural Portrait, 14 LAW & Soc. INQuIRY 631
(1989); and Waldman, supra note 114.
136. Whether unduly polarizing effects even exist in mediation is a subject of de-
bate. Many people remind us that rights can have a unifying effect. See, e.g., SHKLAR,
supra note 16, at 126; Cobb, supra note 80, at 252; Milner, supra note 135, at 656,
671, 674; and Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860 (1987).
137. See Edelman et al., supra note 53, at 529, 530 (noting that individuals who
resolve disputes through mediation may be forced to renegotiate alone the meaning of
discrimination).
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identity.138 Thus, discussion of group rights and the group exit op-
tion can empower individual disputants without undermining the
mediation. 139
Self-determination in mediation is not merely about ensuring
that final, remedial agreements will be made freely. Mediation's
promise of self-determination also encompasses assurances of auton-
omy and control of the bargaining process of the mediation; and the
bargaining process itself includes not only the formal procedure to
which all parties agree to adhere, but also all of the smaller choices
that determine the direction a given mediation will take. 140 Fulfil-
ling the promise of self-determination is, therefore, a formidable task.
Enhancing the group presence in an individual discrimination
dispute, through the use of a first-phase caucus, will help ensure that
choices made in mediation outcome and process will be informed and
truly autonomous. Indeed, a mediator should have an ethical obliga-
tion to take an active role in cultivating the group presence even if a
disputant seems unaware of the group implications of her dispute
and even if the mediator fears that the chances of reaching a settle-
ment will be lessened by enhancing the group presence.
The ethical obligation does not exist because mediators owe
something to the group, as a group. It exists because mediators have
obligations to the parties and to the process. 141 If enhancement of
the group presence will preserve the integrity of mediation as a pro-
cess of self-determination and the outcomes of mediation as reflective
of the true stakes in a dispute, mediators must be activists in work-
ing with the group presence. 142 In fact, involving the group at an
138. Rights - even rights that are viewed as deficiently "individualistic" when in-
voked in litigation - have, in this setting, the ability to draw individuals closer to a
group. See supra note 135 regarding the polarizing effects of rights-based discussions.
139. Rights can remind individuals that complaints are legitimate and worthy of
being taken seriously. Milner, supra note 135 (arguing that rights may provide the
energy needed to pursue change); Grillo, supra note 66 (contending that the ability to
assert a legal right helps women know that their positions have validity and gives
them the energy to pursue change); MERRY, supra note 39 (discussing how rights give
people a sense of entitlement).
140. See DEBORAH M. KOLB & JUDITH WILLIAMS, THE SHADOW NEGOTIATION: How
WOMEN CAN MASTER THE HIDDEN AGENDAS THAT DETERMINE BARGAINING SUCCESS
(2000) (discussing all of the small moves and repositioning that occur in bargaining,
and how choices made during this process will tip the scales regarding outcomes).
141. See Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets, supra note 2, at 1912
(discussing how mediators have an ethical obligation to protect self-determination).
Menkel-Meadow provides an interesting overview of a variety of ethical issues for
mediators. Id. at 1911-22. See also supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
142. Weckstein, supra note 8, explains why mediators can be activists when it
comes to process. As activists, mediators use separate caucuses, claim a right to
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early stage may actually minimize dilemmas mediators might other-
wise face. Although mediation literature on empowerment is sensi-
tive to imbalances of power that arise in mediation, it tends to focus
on what a mediator himself might do in that setting to rectify power
imbalances. Because of the perceived need for activist intervention,
concerns are expressed that the role of the mediator as a neutral
party will be compromised. 143 Cultivating the group presence in a
first-phase caucus is a self-help measure that, if effectively managed,




Using first-phase, private caucuses to enhance the group pres-
ence in an individual discrimination dispute may not inevitably and
always be appropriate, but mediators and civil rights advocates
should take seriously the group presence in an individual discrimina-
tion dispute and take appropriate advantage of the opportunities of-
fered by first-phase caucuses to work with that presence. This
Article argues that enhancing awareness and the group presence
through first-phase caucuses will prepare individual disputants to be
good problem-solvers and ensure self-determination in process and
outcome. 145
promote equality within the process, insist that parties bargain in good faith, and
recognize some constraints on the type of agreements that they will promote. See,
e.g., GoLANN, supra note 51, at 23-25; MOORE, supra note 11; Evans, supra note 80;
Maute, supra note 54; Silver, supra note 2; Yngvesson, supra note 15, at 1704-06.
143. Evans, supra note 80, at 169; Gewurz, supra note 8; Grillo, supra note 66, at
1592; Gunning, supra note 2; Weckstein, supra note 8.
144. As long as the fact and purpose of the meetings is transparent, there should
be no ethical issues with which to deal. Consistent with this objective, the CRS
mediators work to ensure that the process is transparent - that the other side under-
stands why the meetings are being held. Ferrell Interview, supra note 99; Warfield
Interview, supra note 127. Cf BENNETT G. PICKER, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE: A
HANDBOOK FOR RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES (American Bar Association 2d ed.
2003) (1998) (arguing caucuses can be used to address disputes among multiple
defendants).
145. There may, of course, be other reasons to pursue the recommendations of this
Article. For example, if victims of workplace discrimination can be assured that ap-
propriate attention will be paid to the group presence, they may increasingly turn to
mediation rather than courts if courts appear reluctant to grant formal class action
status to a discrimination dispute. See, e.g., Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Rem-
edy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant is Not an Intentional Perpretrator:
The Problems of Unconscious Disparate Treatment and Unjustified Disparate Im-
pacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225, 284-89 (2003) (discussing judicial refusals
to grant class action status). Victims also may opt for mediation if they are unsure
that courts will properly take intra-group conflicts into account. See, e.g., Brown-
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The proposal will undoubtedly raise practical implementation
questions that mediators accustomed to imagining creative and flexi-
ble adaptations of conventional mediation processes should consider.
Attorneys, who frequently have the responsibility for discussing the
mediation option with a client (or with a prospective mediator), for
interviewing and selecting a mediator, 146 and for striking an agree-
ment regarding the conditions on which mediation will occur, will
also undoubtedly have opinions about the proposal. Attorneys litigat-
ing discrimination disputes have thought strategically and ethically
about the group presence in discrimination disputes for many
years, 14 7 and they therefore have a great deal to offer to the discus-
sion of proper uses of first-phase caucuses.
Adapting mediation processes to provide opportunities for culti-
vating the group presence in individual discrimination disputes may
increase the complexity of a dispute. Nonetheless, it will also in-
crease the likelihood that choices made by disputants as to both pro-
cess and outcome will be informed and truly autonomous. It is one
way of ensuring that neither mediation processes nor mediation
agreements become an unintended vehicle for inflicting additional
harm on individual discrimination disputants. 148
This Article began with Justice Marshall's contention that civil
rights disputes necessarily belong in court. Justice Marshall's view
will continue to have validity insofar as mediation processes are not
adapted to accommodate the reality of civil rights disputes. For ex-
ample, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law recently
urged the Supreme Court of the United States to reject another ADR
procedure (arbitration) if that procedure could not accommodate the
Nagin, supra note 56, at 1965-66 (describing the judicial failure to take into account
intraracial conflict in the Atlanta desegregation litigation).
146. A good test of whether a mediator handles individual discrimination disputes
appropriately is whether she believes that awareness (with all of its properties) has a
positive value and is willing to design the mediation process so as to appropriately
enhance awareness. I assume that there are experienced mediators who have
thought about the group presence in disputes and will be willing to flexibly adapt the
practices to "fit the fuss." Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes
of its Own, supra note 2, at 1901. It may be difficult for civil rights advocates to find
such mediators, but doing so is critical for any given mediation. Cf WILLIAM BUTLER
YEATS, ". . . How can we know the dancer from the dance?...," from the poem, Among
School Children, in THE POEMS 221 (Richard J. Finneran, ed., Scribner 2d ed. 1997)
(1989).
147. See Rubenstein, supra note 47 (discussing how the individualist orientation
of judicial rules and procedures for litigation has group consequences).
148. See GriUo, supra note 66, at 1610 (discussing the dangers of a mediation pro-
cess that asks disempowered people to consent to their own oppression).
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class treatment of claims that are inherently class-based. 149 The
first-phase, private caucus is one device that can be used to ensure
that mediation processes do take proper account of the group pres-
ence inherent in individual, workplace discrimination disputes.
149. See Brief of Amici Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et
al. at 4, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003) (No. 02-624).
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